A New Test for Fit State of Mind: Problems and Applications

A dying declaration, as provided in Section 32(1) of the IEA or Section 26(a) of the BSA, is a statement made by an individual at the point of death regarding the circumstances of the transaction that led to their death or the reason behind their death.^[i] It is derived from the Latin term ‘Leterm Mortem’^[ii] and is based on the Latin maxim ‘Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire’, which means that a person would not meet his creator with a lie in his mouth. Theoretically, a dying declaration is hearsay, given that [iii]the declarant cannot depose in court and be cross-examined owing to his death. However, it is admitted in evidence for two reasons. First is because of necessity, i.e., the deceased is generally the only eyewitness, and excluding his statement would impede justice. Secondly, as said by Mather Arnold, it is assumed that ‘truth sits on the lips of a dying man’.[iv] The statement of Lord Baron Eyre in R v. Woodcock^[v] that dying declarations are made in extremity when there is no hope of survival, with every motive of falsehood gone, such that the mind is induced to speak the truth, similar to establishing a duty equivalent to that which is mandated by a positive oath, has held the field even now, making dying declarations significant (Sham Shankar Kankaria v. State of Maharashtra).

This project considers the legal threshold for assessing a declarant’s ability to make a dying declaration. In doing so, it focuses on the case of State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Ram Singh, in which the trial court incorporated a new standard for judging the declarant’s mental state, characterising it as “conscious, oriented, and meaningfully communicative.” The court construed this threshold to mean that the declarant must be “mentally alert.” This new phrasing differs from prior legal precedents, which used the words “conscious and physically capable” to define the fit state of mind for making a dying declaration. The study examines the probable problems and ramifications of implementing this new “mentally alert” requirement in Indian law. Finally, the paper proposes the scenarios in which this new test might be most useful.  

STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) V. RAM SINGH

In this case, the declarant made three dying declarations to three different people, with a time gap between them. The first one was made to a doctor immediately on being admitted to the hospital after the incident, and was recorded as a Medico-Legal Case (16.12.2012). The second declaration was made to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (21.12.2012), and the third was made to the Metropolitan Magistrate (25.12.2012). It is also a relevant fact that the declarant made the third declaration through non-verbal gestures. Apart from that, for both the second and the third declarations, the declarant was certified by the doctor to be conscious, oriented, and meaningfully communicative, which was interpreted by the court as the declarant being ‘mentally alert’ to give her statements. Therefore, it becomes imperative to go through the case laws dealing with the ‘fit state of mind’ requirement.

FIT STATE OF MIND – POSITION OF LAW

Despite the belief that a person on the verge of death will not lie, it is required that the deceased was in a fit state of mind while making the statement to prevent the dying declaration from being tutored or concocted to implicate an innocent person.^[vi] In this regard, in addition to the declarant specifically stating that he was in a fit state of mind, courts insist on the declaration to be corroborated with a medical certificate by a doctor certifying the fit state of mind of the deceased.^[vii] However, None of the rules or statutory provisions have made any attempt to define what exactly constitutes the fit state of mind. The only criterion highlighted has been declarant should be in a fit state of mind and require of doctor’s certification for the same. The reason for leaving it undefined might have been to deal with various situations and each case differently. However, the courts have used certain terminology that necessitates the declarant to be in a particular condition to meet the criteria of ‘fit state of mind. So, it becomes pertinent to examine the judgments stating what it means by a fit state of mind while recording a dying declaration.

The Supreme Court in its case Lallubhai Devchand v State of Gujaratlaid down the initial standard ruling that the recorder of the statement must be satisfied that the declarant has made the statement consciously with full understanding of the implications of the words being used. So, the onus was on the recorder to evaluate the fitness of the declarant by looking into whether the declarant was making the statement consciously and voluntarily with a normal understanding of the words used. This case leads us to two conclusions: first, the spontaneity of the state of mind is important, that is, the state of mind when the statement is being taken is important, not before or after the statement is made. Secondly, a fit state of mind is determined by intention, voluntariness, and understanding of the declarant.

After this case, a case made this matter more interesting when an effort was made by the court to distinguish between ‘conscious’ and ‘fit state of mind’. The case in this regard was Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, in which the apex court made a distinction between ‘conscious’ and ‘fit state of mind’, with the court mandating a doctor’s certification regarding the latter on the ground that mere consciousness does not mean a fit state of mind. So, the court questioned the relevance of the dying declaration because the doctor’s certification stated only the consciousness of the declarant.

The technicality and the distinction were in question in the case of Laxman v State of Maharashtra, and the court came up with altogether different standards. It held that the declarant must be ‘conscious enough to make a statement’. So, the distinction drawn by the earlier judgments was considered too broadly stated and not a correct enunciation of law; therefore, it was struck down, and the ‘declarant’s consciousness’ was made the standard for ‘fit state of mind’.[viii]To reach to that conclusion, the court relied on the case Koli Chunilal Savji and Anr. v. State of Gujarat. Besides that, the court also made the doctor’s certification unnecessary; rather, eyewitness testimony was preferred.[ix]                                          

DIFFERENCE IN TERMINOLOGY AND POSSIBLE REASONS

The trial court in the Ram Singh case used the term ‘mental alertness’ and derived it from the use of words “conscious, oriented, and meaningfully communicative”. The terminology is different from the position of law held in the Laxman case, where the requirement was “conscious and physically capable”. There can be two opposite references drawn from this; first, the trial court meant the same standard, although it used different terminology. This inference comes from the reasoning that the court did not discuss how this test is different from already laid down tests, so the court was following the same line with different nomenclature.

Another inference can be that the court consciously used different terminology and therefore set a higher threshold for the mental fitness test. This inference is drawn because the court firstly insisted on the fact that the doctors had determined the declarant to be ‘conscious, oriented and meaningfully communicative’ and secondly applied the same in the third declaration, which was non-verbal, and finally recorded that the declarant was not expecting drowsiness. The first inference is of little significance to be discussed, considering the precedents on the same line. However, if the second inference is taken, there is a need for more ink to be spilt. Therefore, this project delves into the problems of this test and proposes scenarios where it can be used.

POTENTIAL CHALLENGES OF THE NEW STANDARD

While the new standard seems interesting, it has certain limitations if it is applied to all dying declarations. First, it necessitates the presence of a medical expert to determine whether the declarant was in a ‘mental alertness’ condition or not. This itself poses three major problems first problem of availability, in many situations where a dying declaration occurs, for instance, accident scenes or remote locations, immediate access to doctors will not be possible. Secondly, time sensitivity, the urgent situation will not permit for the delay to call a doctor and wait for him to assess the situation. Thirdly, making medical examination compulsory will bar many potentially crucial declarations from being made relevant just because the doctor is absent.

Apart from that, it is not practically possible. When a person is expecting death, the situation does not allow for an assessment of the mental health of the person; his condition may worsen quickly, therefore, there remains little scope for extensive evaluation. The priority is often on saving the life of the person rather than checking their mental status with regard to the required threshold. Besides these, there always remains a psychological impact of facing death that can affect a person’s demeanour without necessarily impairing the validity of their statement.

Finally, implementing the test would also suffer from the problem of variation in lucidity. A person’s mental alertness may not remain the same, considering the condition in which the declarants are while making such statements. So, a single assessment might not accurately represent the overall capacity to make a valid declaration. Besides many times and often the courts consider other relevant factors for instance, whether the declaration aligns with other known facts of the case (Consistency of the Statement), the context in which the statement was made, including any signs of coercion or confusion (Circumstances of the Declaration) and accounts from those present about the declarant’s apparent state of mind and coherence (Witness Testimony). Although there are certain limitations, this paper seeks to propose that this test can be applied in certain situations and that doctors’ certification should be made compulsory as well. This paper proposes two such situations.

APPLICATION IN TWO SPECIAL SITUATIONS

[I] WHERE THE DECLARATION IS THE SOLE BASIS FOR CONVICTION

In Ram Nath v. State of M.P., the apex court held that an accused cannot be convicted solely on the dying declaration and such a declaration needs to be corroborated, given that it was not made on oath and the declarant was not subject to cross-examination.This case was, however, implicitly overruled by the court in another case, Khushal Rao v. State of Bombay, where the court, after citing Phipson on Evidence, held that there is no absolute rule of law that a dying declaration, unless corroborated, cannot be acted upon as a solitary piece of evidence to convict the accused. In holding the same, the court observed that the contradictory position stated by Ram Nath was merely obiter. It is important to note that both the above cases are three-bench judgments, and there is no constitutional bench that has authoritatively decided the issue and settled the matter. However, subsequent judgments have supported the position of Khushal Rao. For instance, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav, the court held that it is a settled position that if the dying declaration is true, the court can rely on it without corroboration. Similarly, in another case, Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab ^[x]the court held that there is neither any legal rule nor a rule of prudence requiring a dying declaration to be corroborated by other evidence.

Since courts have convicted people solely relying on the dying declaration as a basis for conviction, the standard set should be higher than in Laxman’s case, as mere consciousness. Mental alertness should now be the new standard, wherein assessment by a doctor shall be crucial because of the very high probative value of these kinds of declarations.

[II] WHERE DECLARATION IS MADE BY GESTURES

The law allows dying declarations to be made through signs and gestures, not just speech, as established in Queen Empress v. Abdullah[xi] and demonstrated in the Ram Singh case. This settled ruling of the court necessitates the compelling need for the declarant to be more than just conscious. That’s why the test evolved in the Ram Singh case becomes appropriate here. In these cases, the declarant should be sufficiently alert and able to communicate meaningfully. He/she needs to fully understand the significance of his/her gestures. If the courts continue with the standard of mere consciousness as meeting the ‘fit state of mind’ requirement, there may be situations where the person recording the declaration might misinterpret or make assumptions about the declarant’s gestures. This is explicitly problematic if the declarant isn’t oriented enough to understand what his/her gestures might convey to the declarant.

This is relevant because, in reporting dying declarations, the utterance must be spontaneous and voluntary. Guidelines for reporting also require that the declarant’s actual words or, in the case of gestures, be reported as accurately as possible could be.[xii] By raising the bar above consciousness, the court will then be assured of the fact that the recorded statement indeed reflects what the declarant intended and not the recorder’s take on confusing movements from a barely cognizant person.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, while the stricter standard for determining the mental alertness in a dying declaration of the Ram Singh case is also more demanding in admission, it must judiciously and situation-specifically be applied. This also makes the higher threshold more crucial in two very crucial scenarios: that is, when the dying declaration is the only foundation of conviction, and in cases where the declaration is made through non-verbal means like gestures or signs. In these cases, the psychological alertness standard will provide more reliability in the evidence and ensure lower chances of misinterpretation, thus solidifying the basis of justice. Practically, though, it is difficult to achieve the universal applicability of this standard, such as medical experts for examination, time limits in emergency cases, and barred relevant declarations. It is, therefore, proposed to maintain a balanced approach: enforcement of the mental alertness standard only where situations such as those above are concerned, while maintaining the present ‘consciousness’ standard for other scenarios. Such selective application will certainly allow greater scrutiny in those matters where it is called for, without sacrificing the pragmatic and even-handedness of judicial process where such matters are not in dispute. Adopting this pliable yet discerning approach, the legal system will certainly do more to uphold the integrity of declarations made during the final stages of life as evidence per se, in the interest of justice properly served, while fitting through the diverse circumstances wherein the above crucial statements are taken.

Key words-

Dying Declaration, Consciousness, Mental Alertness, Evidence, Fitness

References:

---

[i] Vidur Laddhad, ‘An Examination of the Dynamics and Obstacles facing the Legal Importance of Dying Declarations in Existing Criminal Jurisprudence’ (2023) 4.2 (1) JCLJ 771, 772.

[ii] Sheikh Abbas Bin Mohd, ‘Nemo Moriturus Praesumntur Mentire: Dying Declaration under the Indian Evidence Act: An Analysis’ (2021) 4 (4) International Journal of Law Management & Humanities 3502, 3504.

 

[iv] Babu Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0855/2003 [7].

[v] King v. William Woodcock, (J 789) 1 Leach, 500.

[vi] K. Ramachandra Reddy v. The Public Prosecutor MANU/SC/0127/1976 [6].

[vii] Paniben v. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/0346/1992 [18].

 

[ix] Laxman v. State of Maharashtra MANU/SC/0707/2002.

[x] Harbans Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0144/1961.

[xi] Queen Empress v. Abdullah MANU/UP/0030/1885.

[xii] Criminal Rules of Practice and Orders, 1990 s. 33.

The article is co-authored by: Sushant Jaiswal, 4th Year Student, National Law School of India University (NLSIU), Bengaluru and Shivani Sharma, 3rd Year Student, Institute of Law, Nirma University (ILNU), Ahmedabad.